Sunandoroy February 1996

The central objective of  economic planning in Indian Economy has over the past fifty years remained “Growth with Social Justice”. Access to and an egalitarian distribution of necessities has always been an essential ingredient for equitable development. A wide spectrum of social security measures on part of the State were designed to tackle the dual menace of poverty and inequality in the access to essential requirements of the Indian populace.  Social security in the Western  sense occupies a marginal place in developing economies due to the different socio-economic conditions. The kind of all-encompassing income support available to the lower income groups in the advanced world  to enable them to cross the poverty line is not comparable to the efforts in developing countries, given the high level of poverty in the latter set of countries. Even then, with a vast majority of the population living below the poverty line, Governments in many countries have sought to protect the weaker sections of the population by providing for  a number of social support programs designed to protect their basic needs.  Public provision of basic needs has typically included subsidized medical facilities, subsidised housing and food distribution programs and various poverty alleviation and employment programmes . At this crucial juncture, when the Indian economy is undergoing rapid economic transformation, these Social Security measures by the state are in need of significant restructuring and rationalization. The  strain on resources of developing world that is eager to embark upon the path of catch-up  industrialization through efficient utilization of existing  resources.

  Therefore, the   issue of targeting of welfare services has assumed  importance to the  resource scarce developing countries like  India.  It is in this context this paper attempts an evaluation of the efficacy of targeting of the public distribution of foodgrains in  the state of  West Bengal in India. 

Survey of Literature on Targeting :

The literature of targeting of social security has a long legacy. The genesis of discussions and debates centered  around the issue of targeting can be traced back to the early nineteenth century .  In the 1820s, the issue of targeting came to be discussed in the  United States in the context of free universal public education while in the 1830s, economists in the United Kingdom debated the justification of the  means tested Poor Law of 1834.

  The issue once again appeared prominently in the 1930s when the world was affected by the great Depression.  With the introduction of the Social Insurance for the Aged in the United States and the Beveridge Report in Britain in 1942, the debate of targeting versus  universalism in social security became prominent in the developing world. The issue of targeting in the 1970s in the wake of the economic slowdown  in the  advanced  world when the disadvantaged  segments of the population demanded additional social support to withstand the economic difficulties.  Akerlof (1978) in  a  pioneering study, concerned himself  mainly  with the  design of tax and transfer programmes  for  poverty alleviation  in the presence of limited  information  on who  the poor are.  Besley and Kanbur  (1988)  characterized  two  types  of  targeting   mechanisms-indicator targeting  and self-targeting.   Indicator  targeting relies on making the transfer contingent on some  easily observable characteristics e.g.  sex, age,  landholding, region of residence, an extra information over and above income  or  consumption  (Akerlof referred  to  this  as  ‘tagging’).  Ravallion (1989) quantifies the  gain  from using additional information.  Haddad and Kanbur  (1991 a) developed the theory of upper limit indicator targeting  where an upper cut-off of an observable  variable, such as age is used to determine eligibility in a transfer  programme  [e.g. in  Supplementary  Feeding].   The other  mechanism, the self targeting mechanism rely  on an  announced scheme that permits  unlimited  participation but is designed in such a way that only members of the  target  group find it  worthwhile  to  participate.  Thus, costly administrative screening and verification of indicators  become unnecessary.  The incentives to  participate are themselves the screen.  Such self screening has been discussed in the latest literature on imperfect information  [Hoff  and  Stiglitz  (1990), Haddad  and Kanbur (1992)].

The arguments  of those in favour of targeting may be summarized here.

The first argument for  selective targeting emanates from the doubts about the sustainability of universal welfare schemes which eat up enormous amount of resources of  the Government and shows downward stickiness by assuming the form of entitlement. Secondly, the administrative and political costs of the universal system have been found to be high as these schemes are financed by taxpayers who are a small segment of the population . Moreover, it is difficult to justify the presence of a sizable  proportion of well off segments of this society as  beneficiaries in universal schemes .

    Universalists , on the other

Targeting in the Indian Context :

The  post-colonial  Indian  welfare policies were  devised  in  an over-ambitious  manner  where Universalism ruled the roost  and adequate attention  was  not paid  to the efficacy of targeting. Of late, there  has been  discussions about targeting the resources  effectively. Regarding provision of health facilities, it has been found that we have created a wide network of health facilities, but the quality of services is so poor that people prefer to avail of the services of private practitioners even at a higher cost. In rural areas, cultural alienation prevents proper utilization of existing facilities. Since the mid-1970s, the state has sought to provide services to the poorer sections by reducing the hospital orientation and instead by emphasizing public health facilities through community health workers. Women’s health has also been given greater attention in recent years.  The Indian policy makers have adopted a universal model of health care in the country.  Adequate health care to all was the motto since Independence.  This `Universal’ model of health care has been found to be ineffective.  The quality of services is substandard and those who can go to the private nursing homes never to the public hospitals.  Roy (1995) has studied the financial impact of universal health care.

  The  need  for  targeting public  housing  towards  the weaker  sections has clearly been spelt out in the  plan documents  which used to provide  information  regarding housing  policy  prior to the  publication  of  National Housing Policy in 1988.  The first five year plan clearly spelt out the major goal of public housing activity:

  “Private  enterprise is not in a position to do the  job as far as low income groups are concerned.  They  cannot afford  to pay the economic rent for housing  accommodation  for even the minimum standards.  The  State,  has,  therefore,  to fill the gap and assist the  construction of  suitable houses for low and middle income groups  in urban  and  rural areas”.

  Over  the entire plan period, this remained the  central objective  of public housing.  The Government, in  order to  fulfill  this objective, devised a large  number  of social  housing schemes to cater to the weaker  sections of  the society.  These schemes, in spite  of  receiving considerable amount of publicity failed to make significant  dent into the housing problems of the weaker  sections.  According to the Official estimates the  housing conditions for the masses improved only marginally since independence.

  Public  housing activity has always been conceived as  a welfare  activity by the planners.  The major  share  of public  housing expenditure was supposed to benefit  the weaker sections of society.  The private housing market,  comprising of profit maximizing entrepreneurs, automatically  excluded  the poorer sections  through  the  high interest  rate  structure, short  repayment  period  and strict  requirements  of collateral  security. Hence, stepping  up of public housing expenditure seemed to  be the only way out of the acute shortage of housing facilities facing the weaker sections.

   Roy (1995) studies the cumulative impact of housing activities of  the  central,  state and  Union Territory Governments, central public  Sector Undertakings  and Other public institutions  engaged  in public  housing activities like Life Insurance  Corporation,  Housing and Urban Development Corporation, General  Insurance  Corporation,  Commercial Banks  and  Apex Cooperative  Housing  Societies in the mid –eighties. He finds that Government Employees emerge  as the most important beneficiary group  getting 61.39 per cent of the net public housing expenditure   ( net of inter-institutional transfer ).  This group is not certainly  the most distressed group as they are  looked after by pay revisions,  dearness allowance, medical re-imbursement,  LTC and a plethora of other  fringe  benefits.   So,  from the distributive point  of  view,  the housing policy has failed to serve its purpose. The  poorer  sections,  comprising of  the  Economically Weaker Section and the Low Income Group, received  20.68  per  cent of public housing expenditure covered  in  our study.   The two major sources of housing for  the  poor are  the Social Housing Schemes and the Priority  Sector Lending  by Commercial Banks.

  Food : poor Targeting

  Poor targeting in foodgrains distribution is a widely discussed theme. The Government has time and again stressed the need for making available subsidised foodgrains to the weaker sections of the population and not to the middle and higher income classes. The Government has , in fact,  taken major initiatives to restructure the public distribution system . A Revamped Public Distribution System to cater to draught-prone and Tribal areas have come into force. People in those vulnerable areas are given foodgrains at half the market price while for others, one can observe a thinning of the spread between issue prices and open market prices.

   A large amount of research has been carried out over the years on the quantitative and financial  impact of  a well targeted public distribution system..  Raj Krishna (1967) pointed out that a well-targeted PDS covering poorest 25 per cent of the Indian population would require an additional 40 per cent of foodgrains for distribution.  Gulati and Krishnan (1975) stated that to provide food to the non-cultivating population less income tax payers, the food distribution through PDS has to be enhanced 3.65 times.  National Commission of Agriculture (1975) stated that if the urban poor and flood and draught prone areas are covered by PDS, this can be achieved through diversion of PDS foodgrains from the non-poor.  Roy (1992) found that to provide 400 gms per adult per day of cereals, to the poorest 30% of urban and agricultural households would entail a 40% increase in food distribution. It can be seen from these studies that restructuring PDS is well within the financial and physical resources available to the Government.

Public Distribution System in West Bengal

The Public Distribution  System was first launched in 1939, immediately after the outbreak of the Second World War to deal with the supply shortages of essential commodities. The scheme has continued to exist since then, though there have been significant changes in its form. Essentially, we have seen three variants of the programme : a) Statutory Rationing – under which the Government takes the entire responsibility of supplying the rationed commodity and no free trade is allowed in the region, b) Modified Rationing/Non-Statutory  Rationing  –  where  fair price  shops  and  markets co-exists, complements  and  at  times competes with each other. c)   Non  statutory interventions by the Government in food  distribution  by  allocating specified quota to a certain  group  of people considered to be in need by the State. West Bengal is one of the forerunners  almost  17 per  cent  of  the  population  in the State  was  under  Statutory Rationing. Statutory Rationing of diverse form and strength  with varied coverage of areas existed in the State since  Independence except  during a phase from 10 July, 1954 to 5 January 1965  when the  system was withdrawn in conformity to other decontrol  measures  in the  economy.  The  rest  of  West  Bengal  was   under Informal/Modified Rationing in which PDS played a supporting role in a market economy.

5.2 Volume of PDS :From the mid sixties, the distribution of foodgrains through  the PDS  has  been  quite significant as a proportion  of  total  PDS issues  in the country (Table V.1). On a per  capital basis  also, the  distribution  of  foodgrains 

via PDS  in  West  Bengal  was substantial relative to the offtake in other states (Table V.2).

5.3 Shares of Statutory and Modified Rationing :The  offtake  of cereals under PDS in West  Bengal  comprised  of provisions  to  Statutory Rationing, Modified Rationing  and  to other categories which included Tea Gardens, employment  generating  programmes  like NREP, RLEGP, ITDP as  also  allocations  to Relief  camps. The shares of Statutory, Modified and  Other  segments  during 1951-1989 are given in Tables V.3 and V.4.  A  graphical representation is given in Graph V.I. One finds a perceptible rise in the  share  of  Modified Rationing  and  other  targeted  schemes (including  provisions  for  employment  generation   programmes, integrated tribal development programmes etc) from 18.9 per  cent in  1951  to over 45.4 per cent in 1989. This seems  to  indicate that  the extension of fair price shops in rural areas led to  an improved  distribution of PDS foodgrains among urban

centres  and rural belts. During the period  1965-89, number of ration shops increased from 2281 to 2746 in  Statutory Rationing Area while in Modified Rationing Areas, the number of ration shops increased from 9963 to 17155. Population served by PDS network grew from 72 lakhs to 98 lakhs in Statutory Rationing Area while in Modified Rationing Areas in population coverage has gone  up from 109 lakhs to almost 5 crores during  the  identical period (Table V.5).

5.4. Issue of Cereals through PDS :The issue of cereals through Public Distribution System has  been much more consistent in the Statutory Rationing Areas due to  the nature  of  intervention in Statutory Rationing Areas.  While  the quota  declared could not be fulfilled in Statutory  or  Modified areas, the provision in Statutory Areas have been more consistent as  revealed by Table V.6. The quantities distributed per  ration card  holder is also much more than the quantity distributed  per ration  card  holder  (Table V.6). Table V.7 shows  a  number  of commodities  distributed per ration card holder in Statutory  and Modified  rationing  areas. As is evident a  ration  card  holder residing in Statutory areas receives 3.56 times more the quantity of  rice, 2.68 times more the quantity of wheat and  11.33  times more  the  quantity  of edible oils as compared  to  the  average ration  card holder in modified rationing localities. This  shows the lack of  targeting of resources distributed through PDS. As  a proportion of the balanced diet norm suggested by Food  and Agricultural  Organization  [FAO  (1973)] the  actual  supply  of cereals per beneficiary stood at 42.7 per cent in 1989 in  Statutory  Rationing areas while for modified rationing areas  it  was only 14.3 per  cent. (Table V.8)

5.5 : Targeting of PDS : A District-wise Analysis : In  order to understand the distribution of cereals  within  West Bengal,  we have  attempted  a district-wise study of the  quantities supplied through public distribution system in 1986. The focus of this study is on the benefits going to the average  consumer living  in a particular locality. The selection of the year  1986 may  be  supported on the ground that it was a normal  year  while distribution  through Public Distribution System  ranged  between 1.56 to 2.91 million tons, in 1986 2.04 million tons of  cereals were issued.

5.6 Methodology : The  consumers benefit has been defined by the extent to which  a consumer is implicitly subsidised from not having to buy from the market. This is denoted by

Si = Qi (CR x RSpi + Cw x WSpi)

where

Si   Subsidy going to the ith region/district.

CR   Share of Rice in the amount supplied through PDS.

Cw   Share of sheet in the amount supplied through PDS.

RSpi Spread  of  Open Market and Issue Price of Rice in 

the  ith region.

WSpi Spread  of Open Market and Issue Price of Wheat in 

the  ith region.

5.7. The  Issue  price is a price determined by the  Government  which changes several times a year. Therefore the weighted issue  price has been taken by using the number of months as weights.

Symbolically   

     P    =    Weighted Issue Price

     P    =    ith  Issue Price,

      i = 1…n is the number of  issue prices announced in a year.

     Mi   =    number of months

     M    =    Total number of months in a year i.e. twelve

5.8 Open Market Prices :For rice, the high and low monthly average retail price for  districts  have been taken as open market price whereas  for  wheat, the  monthly average retail price have been taken. This has  been done  because the price of rice fluctuates whereas that of  wheat remain  relatively stable. Monthly average is expected to  remove the seasonal fluctuations.(Table V.9).

5.9 Spread :The spread or the unit consumer subsidy is the difference between Open Market retail price and the weighted issue price.

5.10 Population of the districts – 1986 : The  Compound  rate of growth of population per year  during  the period  1981 to 1991 was 3 percent. Accordingly, the  blowing  up factors for the year 1986 was 1.0628. After multiplying the  blow-up factor with the population of 1981, we get the estimated  population of the respective districts for 1986.

5.11 Estimation of Adult Equivalent :While  calculating  the adult equivalent i.e. number  adults  in  the state or its districts, it has been assumed that persons below 14 years  of age consume half the amount of those above 14 years  of age.  No distinction in consumption is made between  the  genders though it may be pointed out that various nutrition committees  have assigned  the  weight  0.8 for female when the male  adult  is  considered as an unit. Thus the Adult Equivalent is

A    =    0.50 x Persons below 14 years + Persons above 14 years

We  find  what in 1981, approximately 40 percent of  the  popular were below 14 years so

A    =    0.50 x 40% of population + 60% of population.

5.12.  Findings : It  is apparent from the distribution of subsidy per person  and subsidy per adult equivalent that although the population of  the statutorily rationed areas constituted 16.2 percent of the adults in  West Bengal, over 40% of the total consumers subsidy  accrued to them (Table V.9).This  unequal scenario is also evident from the  distribution  of subsidy per person and subsidy per adult equivalent. Subsidy  per person  per  year in the statutory Rationing area was Rs.  29.33 (Low) and Rs. 53.66 (High) while in modified rationing areas  the per  capita  subsidy was in the range Rs. 7.63 to Rs.  13.96  per year. Subsidy per adult equivalent in Statutory Rationing  areas was  in the range of Rs. 31.65 to Rs. 57.90 per year whereas  for modified Rationing belts it was Rs. 9.59 – Rs. 17.45 per capital per year (Table V.10).Within  the  districts too considerable amount  of  inequity  was noticed as in evident from the inequality indices presented below :

Item  Mean          S.D.          C.V.
Quantity distributed   63.29      45.92          72.55
Subsidy per person  8.31-16.06   7.39-16.03   88.95-99.85
Subsidy per adult eqv 1.13-21.51  9.12-19.99   81.96-92.95

Note : See Table V.11 for details.

Therefore,  it is evident that the public distribution system  in West Bengal has suffered from poor targeting and hence the  benefits have been unequally distributed among districts.


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