Sunando Roy 2006

Introduction

High volatility in asset prices is worrisome because, when financial unbalances unwind, the real economy is exposed to a substantial economic downturn and, very frequently, to recession and possible deflation.

Most industrial countries experienced sometimes violent boom and bust cycles in credit markets in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Hofmann, 2001). Similarly, Latin American countries experienced a boom and bust cycle in both, property prices and credit aggregates. There is clear evidence that in Latin American countries during the 1990s, asset prices booms contributed to an increased perception among individuals about positives changes in wealth and their creditworthiness that allowed agents to increase their indebtedness (Herrera and Perry, 2003).

Likewise, housing prices are more likely to end in a bust and to be costly. For example, Helbling and Terrones (2003) find that only 25 per cent of the equity-price booms in the past 30 years ended in busts, while around 50 per cent of house price booms ended in bust. Policy-makers should also be aware of the fact that bubbles in house prices are more worrisome that those in equity prices, in part, because these tend to reflect domestic credit conditions, whereas equity prices tend to reflect global forces (Selody and Wilkins, 2004).

Housing price bubbles give home buyers a false sense of the real return they can expect on their investment, which can lead to speculative home buying and overinvestment in the real housing stock. This can lead to overinvestment in physical capital, overconsumption, and overextension of credit. The process reverses when the bubble burst. The decline in housing prices results in a deterioration in balance sheets that constrains spending and investment. Given a lower value of collateral, defaults start and  the financial institutions are less willing to lend. This can cause decreased investment and increased bankruptcies.

II

Real Estate Exposures of Commercial Banks in India :

A System Level Assessment

 In the Indian Context, for the past two years we are witnessing an acceleration of credit to commercial sector. Non-food credit, on a year-on-year basis, registered a growth of 30.8 per cent as on March 31, 2006 on top of a base as high as 28.8 per cent a year ago. The expansion of bank credit to  housing sector was strong, benefiting from low interest rates and tax incentives. Credit to the commercial real estate increased sharply, although it still constitutes only a small part – less than two per cent of outstanding non food bank credit . The non-performing component of housing loans by commercial banks at 2.1 per cent as on December 2005 is still at a moderate level. ( Table 1)

Table 1:Growth in Retail credit and commercial real estate

( Rs. Crore)

Source : OSMOS .

ParticularsOutstanding as at the end (All banksNon performing loans (%)
 Mar-04Mar-05Dec-05Mar-04Mar-05Dec-05
Housing loan894491342761682131.91.92.1
Consumer durable6256381037636.69.69.0
Credit Card61678405115346.37.97.3
Car LoanNA3504354552NA2.01.9
Other Personal loans87170850771092392.63.83.4
Gross Retail loans1890422666103473002.52.82.7
Growth in gross retail loansNA41.030.3   
Total retail loans as % of Gross credit22.023.726.0   
Total Gross credit85909211250561334940   
       
Memo:      
Commercial Real estate loans 1641937877   
Total real estate including housing loans 150695206090   

As the total real estate exposure  including Housing Loans jump more than 33 per cent since March 2005 and thereby crossing            Rs. 2,06,090 crore, there is a need to take a look at the emerging risks at the real estate sector. The following analysis is an exploration into the risks present in the Indian real estate market.

Data Analysis

For the purpose of analysis, quarterly OSMOS data have been used.  All banks real estate exposures for December 2005 has been normalized by their asset size.  

Measures of  Central Tendency

The risk in this market seems to be rather low when looked in terms of averages. The mean exposure of commercial banks is highest in housing loans at 3.69 per cent of assets. The rest of the exposures in commercial real estate, mortgages and land and building development add up to another 1.55 per cent. However, it is also apparent that the maximum exposure by a single bank in the real estate market is much higher.

Table 2 :  Scheduled Commercial Banks’ Average Exposure in Real Estate Market

( as a proportion of assets)

 Commercial Real estateIndividual Housing LoansLand and BuidingMortgages
 Mean0.783.690.550.20

Note : Disaggregated data on Banks have been used  by  calculating the real estate exposures in proportion to their total assets

Measures of Dispersion

Measures of dispersion tell us how the risks are distributed. It tells us whether such risks are concentrated in a few banks, which is a cause of concern for policy authorities or they are well diversified.  Measures of variability such as the Standard distribution show greater variability in bank exposure to real estate sector.

Higher kurtosis points towards thicker tails in the data implying more extreme values in the data than that can be accurately predicted by the normality assumptions.

Table 3 : Measures of Variability and Extreme Values

 Commercial Real estateIndividual Housing LoansLand and BuildingMortgages
 Skewness3.511.521.613.76
 Kurtosis17.166.604.8819.59
Standard Deviation1.593.890.780.47

Correlation Structure

There is hardly any significant association between the commercial real estate loans given by banks and the individual housing loans given by Banks. If the same set of Banks were providing both types of loans, there would be greater risk faced by those banks in the event of an asset price shock. However, for the present, the risks seem to be well distributed.  Significantly, commercial real estate loans have very little relation with housing loans ( a correlation coefficient of -0.01), indicating different sets of banks financing the two fast growing  activities.

Table 4: Correlation among types of Real Estate Exposures

 Commercial Real EstateIndividual Housing LoansLand and BuildingMortgages
Commercial Real Estate1.00-0.010.17-0.06
Individual Housing Loans-0.011.000.280.20
Land and Building0.170.281.000.09
Mortgages-0.060.200.091.00

Distributional Properties in Bank Exposure to Real Estate

Theoretical quantiles are effective tests of divergence from normality of distribution. The absence of normality evident in the Quantile- Quantile graphs below show us that there are more banks at the tail of the distribution than the normal distribution would permit.  With a view to identify the Banks that face greater risk in the real estate sector as compared to the other banks, the superevisor would need to monitor the more aggressive  banks in the real estate market  more closely. This can be critical input to the system of surveillance of Banks.

III.

Performance Analysis of Individual Banks

In real estate market  , there are at present four  categories of Banks, Overaggressive ( exposed by more than 20 per cent of asset size), moderately aggressive ( exposure in Real estate including housing loans between 10-15 per cent of assets ), cautious  ( 4-10 per cent) and dormant( less than 2 per cent).

A,. Overagressive

More than 20 per ent of assets deployed in real estate and individual housing taken together. Two Banks fall in this category.

!   ICICI BANK ( 24.72 per cent of asset in real estate market)

2.. Standard Chartered Bank ( 21.1 per cent of assets in the real estate market)

Clearly, these two bank’s exposure in the real estate market require further exploration. Concerned Bank Monitoring Divisions may be advised suitably in this regard.

B. Moderately Aggressive ,

Exposure to real estate ( including individual housing) at 10-15 per cent of their assets. They should be monitored as they may become very aggressive in near future,  The following six banks fall in this category:

Capital Local Area Bank Ltd14.72
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation 13.89
Vijaya Bank13.27
ABN AMRO Bank N.V.12.08
Corporation Bank11.59
Citibank N.A.10.23

 It is proposed that RBI monitors on a quarterly basis  whether  the exposures  are increasing in the market.

3. Cautious Banks

Majority of Banks( 46) have exposures in the real estate market to the tune of  4-10 per cent of their assets. These are cautious banks. It is proposed that OSMOS monitors on a quarterly basis  whether some of them are migrating to the moderately aggressive category.

4. Dormants

 Rest of the Banks ( 36 in number) are exposed to the extent of  less than 2 per  cent of assets in real estate.  No action is required.  The graph below shows the distribution of real estate exposure ( including housing)

————————————————————————————————————


Discover more from SUNANDO ROY – On Banking, Finance and Society

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

Leave a Reply